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THE GRADUAL DECLINE OF A HEARSAY
EXCEPTION: THE MISAPPLICATION OF
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(4), THE
MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS HEARSAY EXCEPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Incest and child sexual abuse perpetuates as an abysmal
malady of humanity. During the concluding years of the
1960s, however, criminal laws were created for the first time
to exclusively cover sexual abuse.' Since that time, the re-
ported offenses have dramatically increased.2 As a result, the
American people demanded that the criminal and legal sys-
tems effectively stop and deter child abuse perpetrators.3
The use of child-victim testimony is fundamental for suc-
cessfully prosecuting child abusers.! Since a significant
number of these child-victim statements are made out of
court, a great legal dilemma exists as to how to admit such
statements into evidence.5 Out-of-court statements offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted are considered hear-
1. Nancy Thoennes & Jessica Pearson, Summary of Findings from the
Sexual Abuse Allegations Project, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY
AND VISITATION CASES 1 (E. Bruce Nicholson & Josephine Buckley eds., 1988).
2. Id. The reporting incidence was believed to be 1.87 per 10,000 children
in 1978, 5.76 per 10,000 children in 1980, 9.0 per 10,000 children in 1982, and
15.88 per 10,000 children in 1984. Id.
3. Some of these demands consisted of initiating programs intended to in-
crease the reporting and prosecution of child sexual abuse such as expanding
child protective programs and to greatly increase the number of caseworkers to
investigate reported incidences of child abuse. See David C. Raskin & John C.
Yuille, Problems in Evaluating Interviews of Children in Sexual Abuse Cases, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 184, 185 (S.J. Ceci et al., eds., 1989).
Furthermore, women groups successfully lobbied for more punitive penalties
for sex offenders and established victim/witness funds and programs to provide
social and financial support for women who were victims of sexual abuse and
whose husbands/partners sexually abused their children. See JAMES SELKIN,
THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM 281 (2d ed. 1991).
4. See JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE 260 (1987).
5. See id.
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say6 and are only allowed into evidence if the statement
qualifies under a specific hearsay exception.' As a result,
children's hearsay statements "take on [an] extraordinary
significance in the context of child abuse litigation [because
such statements] constitute the most important evidence in
the case."8 This significance sometimes induces courts to
"force-fit" such statements under a specific hearsay excep-
tion.9
For example, some federal courts admit hearsay state-
ments made by a child to a physician that identify the alleged
abuser."° These federal courts admit this evidence under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), the medical diagnosis hear-
say exception." However, admitting these hearsay state-
ments under the medical diagnosis exception contradicts the
drafters' intent of Rule 803(4) because the identifying state-
ments cast fault on the named persons. 2 Consequently, the
diverse court interpretations and applications of Rule 803(4)
have caused inconsistent and contradictory results in child
6. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
7. See discussion infra Part IIB-C.
8. See MYERS, supra note 4, at 260. The child-victim is predominately the
only witness to the crime because the abuser is quite often someone who the
child initially trusts and, therefore, the abuser has many opportunities to be
alone with the child while committing the crime. Id. at 260-61 (citing Judy
Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay in Sex Abuse Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1745 (1983)).
9. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23).
10. Some of these federal courts are: (1) the Eighth Circuit in Lovejoy v.
United States, 92 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d
172 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Renville, 779
F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985); (2) the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d
1446 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993);
and; (3) the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir.
1995); Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993). See discussion
infra Part II.E.
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). Rule 803(4) states: "Statements made for the
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general char-
acter of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment." Id.
12. The drafters' intent was to admit statements made to health-care pro-
viders for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment and not to admit
statements that cast fault. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
The Advisory Committee's Note offers an example for this premise stating that
"a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but
not his statement that the car was driven through a red light." Id.
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abuse allegation cases."
This comment discusses the effects of various federal
courts' applications of the medical diagnosis hearsay excep-
tion. In particular, it describes the federal courts' expansive
uses of the medical diagnosis hearsay exception by discussing
several court rationales that support admitting child-victim
hearsay statements, which identify alleged child abusers. 4
This comment emphasizes how these different and expansive
uses contradict the intended purpose for having hearsay ex-
ceptions,15 as well as the inherent trustworthiness that is
imbedded within the medical diagnosis exception." The
comment also illustrates how the current trend of expanding
the coverage of the medical diagnosis exception is effectively
making Rule 803(4) a less "firmly rooted" and well-
established hearsay exception. 7
II. BACKGROUND
The background section is divided into five parts. First it
discusses the child abuse problem in the United States and
how society has attempted to curb this problem. 8 Next it ex-
plains the Hearsay Rule and the reasons why hearsay state-
ments are generally excluded from evidence. 9 The third part
discusses the main purposes for having exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule,2° and section four explains and discusses the
rationale and scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), the
medical diagnosis hearsay exception.2' Finally, the last sec-
13. See discussion infra Part II.E.
14. See discussion infra Part II.E.
15. The intended purpose for having hearsay exceptions is that under par-
ticular situations a hearsay statement may contain 'circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the person at trial."
FED R. EVID. 803(1)-(23) advisory committee's note. In addition, guidelines on
how and when to apply the hearsay exceptions is described not only in the rules
themselves, but also in the Advisory Committee's Note, the House Judiciary
Committee Report and the Senate Judiciary Committee Report for each hear-
say exception. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
16. It is accepted by courts that a patient has a very strong motivation to be
truthful when consulting a physician or any other health care provider for an
accurate diagnosis or treatment. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's
note. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.
20. See discussion infra Part II.C.
21. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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tion discusses the federal courts' application of Rule 803(4);
in particular, how and why some federal courts have ex-
panded this rule to include child-victim hearsay statements
that identify their abusive perpetrators.
2
A. The Child Abuse Problem
In 1997, over three million children were reported as
having been victims of child abuse and neglect.23
Approximately 47 out of every 1,000 children are reported as
victims of some form of abuse.24 Physical and sexual abuse
accounts for 30% of these reportings.2 ' This amounts to
approximately 5% to 16% of all American men and 20% to
25% of all American women who have experienced some form
of sexual abuse prior to the age of 18.26 The median age at
the time of sexual abuse for boys is 9.9 years and for girls it
is 9.6 years.27 Approximately 115,000 cases of child sexual
abuse are handled by child protective services annually.28 A
child-protection organization once concluded that
approximately only one-half of all reports of child sexual
abuse in the United States produce enough evidence for
authorities to prosecute. Regardless of the successful
prosecution of child sexual abusers, all sexual abuse has
possible longstanding adverse mental and physical effects on
the victims. ° Rightfully so, in 1990, the United States
22. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. United States, 92 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d
807'(9th Cir. 1995); Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pro-
vost, 875 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir.
1987); United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). See also discussion infra Part II.E.
23. See Nat'l Comm. to Prevent Child Abuse, Child Abuse and Neglect Sta-
tistics (visited Jan. 6, 1999) <http://www.childabuse.org/facts97.html>.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Nat'l Comm. to Prevent Child Abuse, Child Sexual Abuse (visited
Jan. 6, 1999) <http://www.childabuse.org/fs 19.html>.
27. See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 415 (3d. ed. 1992).
28. See Nat'l Comm. to Prevent Child Abuse, Child Sexual Abuse (visited
Jan. 6, 1999) <http://www.childabuse.org/fsl9.html>.
29. This child-protection organization is called the Association for Protect-
ing Children. Raskin & Yuille, supra note 3, at 185.
30. The degree of harm depends upon the nature of the act, the age of the
child, and the child's general environment. See Nat'l Comm. to Prevent Child
Abuse, Child Sexual Abuse (visited Jan. 6, 1999)
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government declared the child abuse situation a national
31
emergency.
Statistics such as these caused many organizations and
political leaders to search for programs and coordinate efforts
to "increase the reporting and prosecution" of child abuse
crimes.32 Similarly, the public supported such programs and
efforts designed to curb this problem, many of which turned
out to be impractical and ineffective." For example, in the
fifteen million dollar McMartin pre-school child abuse case in
Los Angeles, California,"4 the district attorney's office
"arranged for bulldozers to excavate huge trenches around
the school in order to verify the children's reports of having
been tortured in underground dungeons."" Despite these
extreme measures, none of the seven defendants were found
guilty of any of the more than fifty charges held against
them.
Unverifiable allegations seem to be a common occurrence
in child abuse cases. In 1985, it was found that "more than
sixty-five percent of all reports of suspected child [abuse]-
involving over 750,000 children per year-turned out to be
<http://www.childabuse.orglfsl9.html>. Physical harm may include cuts, dis-
figurement, deformity, and pregnancy. Id. Mental harm may consist of feel-
ings of pain, panic, devastation, betrayal, shame, fear, guilt, and vulnerability
that may persist throughout the victim's life. Id.
31. See Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the
Children?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception
Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 201, 207 (1995).
32. See Raskin & Yuille, supra note 3, at 185.
33. See JAMES SELKIN, THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM
287 (2d ed. 1991).
34. The McMartin case began in August 1983, when Judy Johnson, a
mother of a child at the nursery school in question, reported to police that her
son's bottom was red and that her son mentioned a man named Ray who
worked at the school. As a result, letters were sent alerting parents to check
their children for signs of molestation. On the basis of Johnson's complaint,
prosecutors alleged that Ray Buckey, his mother, sister, grandmother, and
three other women teachers had molested hundreds of children at the school
over the course of five years. Children told investigators accounts of satanic
rites and animals being tortured to frighten the youngsters into silence. The
alleged forty-one child-victims was narrowed down to eleven by the time the
trial began. The trial ran for thirty-three months and cost fifteen million dol-
lars. This case was the longest and most expensive criminal proceeding in
United States history. However, none of the defendants were found guilty of
any of the more than fifty charges held against them. See Lynda Deutsch,
Mother, Son Acquitted in Mcmartin Child Molestation Case. Jury Says "Not
Guilty" on 52 Charges, Deadlocks on 13 Others in U.S.' Longest, Costliest Trial,
S. F. EXAM'R, Jan. 18, 1990, at Al.
35. See SELKIN, supra note 33, at 287.
36. See Deutsch, supra note 34, at Al.
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volving over 750,000 children per year-turned out to be
unfounded."3 7 Of the cases that are actually investigated, at
least eight percent are fictitious.38 With such a rate of
fictitious allegations, it is possible that over 8,000 actions are
falsely prosecuted each year.39 In cases involving family
disputes the fictitious allegation rate is even greater; it is
allegedly as high as 50 percent.0 Despite these numbers, it
is likely that "many of [these] formerly 'unsubstantiated'
cases [will] proceed to formal prosecutorial actions" because
society generally favors the prosecution of alleged abusers.4
B. Hearsay
1. The Hearsay Rule: Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and
802
The Hearsay Rule, set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence
42ha802, states that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as pro-
vided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Su-
preme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress." 3 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines the term
"hearsay.""' This rule states that hearsay is "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."" The declarant is the person who made the
37. Raskin & Yuille, supra note 3, at 185 (quoting Besharov, the former Di-
rector of the U.S. National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect).
38. See id. at 186.
39. See id. For example, in Scott County, Minnesota, cases were "dismissed
against twenty-one persons accused of child sexual abuse even while investiga-
tions were in progress concerning allegations of homicide and sexual abuse
made by some of the alleged child victims." Id. at 187.
40. See id. at 186. Since 1974, University of Utah researchers conducted
polygraph examinations on persons accused of sexually abusing children. "Test
outcomes consistent with truthful denials of sexual abuse ... increased from
50% in the 1974-82 period to 79% truthful outcomes in the 1983-87 period. A
large proportion of these allegations arose in domestic relations disputes ...
" Raskin & Yuille, supra note 3, at 186.
41. See id. at 186.
42. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
43. Compare id., with FED. R. EVID. 803 (the statement contained in Rule
802 allows courts the opportunity to admit hearsay statements if they fit under
the Rule 803, 804 or 807 hearsay exceptions).
44. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
45. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). This Rule also describes types of statements made
by a declarant that are not considered hearsay. However, for this discussion,
an explanation of those particular examples is not pertinent. See FED. R. EVID.
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original statement, which is repeated by a witness at trial.46
In addition to an out-of-court statement being repeated,
the statement must be offered for the truth of the matter as-
serted in order for it to be excluded from evidence. The mere
statement is not the sole reason for the exclusion, rather the
intent of use of the statement is also pertinent.47 Evidence is
only hearsay when "the repeated statement [is] offered for
the purpose of proving that what the declarant said is true. 48
For example, assume that a declarant stated to a witness
that he saw the accused assailant hit the victim over the
head with a baseball bat. Suppose then, that this statement
is later offered by the witness in court to prove the type of
weapon the accused assailant used to attack the victim. This
statement is hearsay because the statement was used to
prove that the assault and battery was committed with a
baseball bat.49 Hence, the statement was used for the truth
of what it stated. Therefore, upon objection by the opposing
party, the statement will be excluded from evidence ."
2. The Dangers of Hearsay Evidence
In enacting Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 802, Con-
gress recognized the problems associated with hearsay evi-
dence.5' Hearsay evidence does not allow the judge or jury to
personally evaluate a witness' "perception, memory, and nar-
ration in the courtroom."5 2 In order to encourage the witness
to accurately communicate these factors and to "expose any
inaccuracies which may enter the testimony of the witness,
Anglo-American tradition 3 developed three conditions under
801(d).
46. See FED. R. EVID. 801(b). A witness on the trial stand who repeats his
own out-of-court statements is considered as both a witness and a declarant of
the statement at issue. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
47. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 157,
157-58 (1978).
48. Id. at 157.
49. Alternatively, the statement would not be considered hearsay if the
statement was not used for the purpose of proving the means of assault and
battery, but rather, it was used to identify the assailant. In this alternative
situation, the statement is not being used for the truth of the matter asserted,
but rather it is being used to identity the assailant. Therefore, the statement
would not be considered hearsay.
50. See LILLY, supra note 47, at 157-58.
51. FED. R. EVID. advisory committee introductory note to hearsay.
52. See id.
53. The Anglo-American tradition described in this sense is the common
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which witnesses will ideally be required to testify: (1) under
oath, (2) in the personal presence of the trier of fact, and (3)
subject to cross examination."54
The basis and rationale for the Hearsay Rule focuses on
the importance of cross-examination.55 To be sure, John
Henry Wigmore, one of the prominent 20th century scholars
on the law of evidence,56 stated:
[Tihe policy of the Anglo-American system of Evidence has
been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-
examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that
no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is
comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and
the conviction that no statement (unless by special
exception) should be used as testimony until it has been
probed and sublimated by that test, has found increasing
strength in lengthening experience."
The American legal process depends upon cross-
examination to expose the imperfections of perception,
memory, and narration of the witness.58  The cross-
examination of a witness serves to expose the many possible
deficiencies of that person's statements.59
Graham C. Lilly also emphasized the importance of
cross-examination.60  According to Lilly, most hearsay
objections arise when "the opponent is unable to confront and
cross-examine the 'real' witness-the declarant-and to
expose [the] weaknesses in his statement."6  These
weaknesses are commonly referred to as the "hearsay
dangers."6 Lilly defines these dangers as follows:
(a) Defects in perception involves disabilities that arise
from a failure or inability to observe or hear accurately.
(b) Defects in memory involves inaccurate or incomplete
recollection.
law precedent that has evolved from English common law to American common
law beginning in the 1500's. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
9 (3d ed. 1940).
54. FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's introductory note to hearsay.
55. See id.
56. See WIGMORE, supra note 53.
57. WIGMORE, supra note 53, at 28-29.
58. See FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's introductory note to hearsay.
59. See WIGMORE, supra note 53, at 3.
60. See LILLY, supra note 47, at v.
61. Id. at 157.
62. Id. at 159.
[Vol. 39
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(c) Defects in sincerity or veracity involves testimonial
faults that arise from a reluctance to tell the complete
truth, or from a conscious effort to distort or falsify.
(d) Defects in transmission involves mistransmissions that
arise because the declarant's statement is ambigious or
incomplete. 63
Attempting to avoid these dangers, common law
developed a general rule excluding all hearsay evidence."
However, common law also enumerated specific exceptions to
this general rule and Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804
mirrored these exceptions.65 Hearsay statements may fall
under one of these exceptions when the statements are made
under circumstances that foster a high probability of
truthfulness, and when cross-examination of these
statements would be futile.66
C. Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804: The Hearsay
Exceptions
The Federal Rules of Evidence contain twenty-eight
exceptions to the Hearsay Rule.67 Each hearsay exception
"proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to
justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial
even though he may be available." 8
1. General Principles for the Hearsay Exceptions
The primary reason supporting the hearsay rule is that
the unchallenged testimony of a witness might have been
derived from inaccurate and untrustworthy sources.69 These
inaccurate and untrustworthy sources are best exposed and
tested by the cross-examination process. ° However, there
63. Id.
64. See FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's introductory note to hearsay.
65. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23) and 804(b)(1)-(4). Rule 803 contains
twenty-three exceptions and Rule 804 contains four exceptions. Id. In addi-
tion, recently enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 807 is the "Residual Exception"
that substituted former Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). See FED. R. EVID. 807.
66. See FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's introductory note to hearsay.
67. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4), and 807.
68. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
69. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 53, at 202.
70. See id.
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are instances when cross-examination is not necessary
because the circumstances surrounding the statement
naturally promote creditable and accurate statements."
Hence, cross-examination of statements created in these
situations would be an unnecessary process for finding the
truth of the matter asserted. 2  Additionally, cross-
examination may not be possible when the declarant is
rendered unavailable. 3 Therefore, in order to allow hearsay
statements into evidence, it must be necessary that the
statements be admitted into evidence and the statements
must have been made under circumstances that promote
trustworthiness.7 4  Therefore, the necessity for use and the
trustworthiness of the statement is essential to the creation
and use of a hearsay exception. 5
a. Necessity
There must be some necessity for using a hearsay
statement. 6 Necessity occurs when the only alternative to
using a hearsay statement is to not use the evidence at all.77
Necessity normally occurs in either one of two situations.8
The first situation occurs when the declarant is considered
unavailable for further cross-examination. 79  The second
71. See id. See also, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23).
72. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 53, at 202.
73. See id. See also, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804. Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a) defines a witness as being unavailable when the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement;
or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of
the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3)
testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing be-
cause of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;
or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance ... by process or
other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if
his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is
due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement
for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)-(5).
74. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 53, at 202.
75. See id. See also discussion infra Part II.C.l.a-b.
76. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 53, at 202.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. The Federal Rules of Evidence defines five situations in which
they consider a declarant unavailable to act as a witness. See supra note 73
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situation occurs when the hearsay statement was made
under a very unique set of circumstances and cross-
examination of the declarant would not add more
creditability to the statements. ° However, necessity alone is
not sufficient for accepting the statement into evidence."
The statement must also be made under a highly trustworthy
situation;82 only then may a substantial reason exist for
admitting the statement.83
b. Trustworthiness
When a statement is made in a highly trustworthy
situation,84 cross-examination is not necessary because the
hearsay dangers are avoided.85 Therefore, when a situation
supports the inference that uncontested testimony will not
contain defects in perception, memory, sincerity, veracity, or
transmission, the statement is most likely accepted into
evidence. 6
2. Deciding When a Hearsay Statement Is Admitted
Under a Hearsay Exception
The general rule for admitting a hearsay statement
under a hearsay exception is to admit the evidence only when
it "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."87 Courts
hold that the admission of such statements under a hearsay
exception "satisfies the constitutional requirement of
reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding
judicial and legislative experience in assessing the
and accompanying text.
80. See 5 WIGMORE supra note 53, at 204. An example of this type of situa-
tion is contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), the Excited Utterance
hearsay exception. FED R. EVID. 803(2). The Excited Utterance exception is
based on the fact that the declarant makes a statement under the stress of ex-
citement that was caused by a startling or surprising event. Id. The situation
deters any possibilities of reflection or fabrication by the declarant. See FED. R.
EVID. 803(1) and (2) advisory committee's note. The medical diagnosis excep-
tion is another example of this situation and is discussed in greater detail infra
Part II.D.
81. See 5 WIGMORE supra note 53, at 202.
82. Trustworthy situations are described as circumstances that naturally
deter the creation of fabricated statements by the declarant. Id. at 205.
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23) and 804(b)(1)-(4).
85. See 5 WIGMORE supra note 53, at 203.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816-18 (1990).
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trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements."'
To be sure, Justice Blackmun once noted that "[s]tatements
squarely within established hearsay exceptions possess the
imprimatur of judicial and legislative experience.., and that
fact must weigh heavily in our assessment of their reliability
for constitutional purposes." 9 As a general rule, therefore,
hearsay evidence is admitted when it fits squarely within the
original framework of a hearsay exception.
D. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4): Statements for Purposes
of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment
1. Rationale for the Exception
Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), the
medical diagnosis exception to the Hearsay Rule, to include
statements that describe the nature and cause of an injury
and which affect the medical diagnosis or treatment of such
injury.9 ° The underlying rationale to this rule is that the
declarant's motive guarantees its trustworthiness. 9' The
declarant has a great motivation to be truthful with his or
her doctor because the "[declarant's] health-even life-may
depend on the accuracy of information supplied [to] the
doctor."92
2. The Statement Does Not Need to be Made to a
Physician
The declarant's self-interest in offering accurate
information for diagnosis or treatment is the underlying
rationale behind the medical diagnosis exception;93 however,
the statement does not have to be made to a physician.
9 4
Statements made to any person for the purpose of diagnosis
88. Id. at 817.
89. Id. at 817 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 552 (1986)).
90. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). Rule 803(4) states: "Statements made for the
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general char-
acter of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment." Id.
91. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
92. 2 MEYERS, supra note 27, at 287-88.
93. Id. at 287.
94. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
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or treatment are allowed under this hearsay exception.95 For
example, such statements do not have to be communicated to
only attending physicians or nurses; rather statements made
to psychiatrists, social workers, "hospital attendants,
ambulance drivers, or even members of the family" may fall
under this hearsay exception.96 The important distinction is
that the statements are made to someone for the purpose of
obtaining proper medical diagnosis or treatment.97
3. Statements Identifying an Alleged Perpetrator
The Advisory Committee's Note stipulates that
"statements as to fault [do] not ordinarily qualify under this
hearsay exception."9 Accordingly, "a patient's statement
[articulating] that he was struck by an automobile [qualifies]
but his statement that the car was driven through a red light
[does not]."99 However, some federal courts admit child abuse
victims' statements that identify their alleged sexual or
physical perpetrator when the statements are made to a
medical provider. 00 In effect, this practice has expanded the
scope of the medical diagnosis hearsay exception by
disregarding the Advisory Committee Note and including
statements that cast fault on alleged child abusers. 0'
E. The Expansion of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) to
Include the Identity of Accused Child Abuse Perpetrators
1. United States v. Iron Shell
In 1975, Congress codified and passed the Federal Rules
of Evidence.' 2 In 1980, United States v. Iron Shell.. was the
first Eighth Circuit case to apply the medical diagnosis
exception in its decision.' In Iron Shell, the defendant
appealed a jury conviction of assault with intent to commit
95. See id.
96. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See discussion infra Part II.E.
101. See id.
102. See FED. R. EVID.
103. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
104. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 83 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980).
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rape upon a nine-year-old girl.' The defendant challenged
the admission of statements made by the child-victim to her
doctor.' °6 The doctor examined the child and elicited a series
of statements from the girl concerning the cause of her
injuries."°7
The court allowed the child-victim's statements into
evidence and held that Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4)
changed the common law0 8 in two ways. The court stated
that the rule "adopted an expansive approach by allowing
statements concerning past symptoms and those which
related to the cause of the injury." 9 The rule also negated
the "distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the
purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of
diagnosis only.""0
As a result, the Iron Shell court proposed a two-part test
for determining the admissibility of statements under this
medical diagnosis exception. First, the declarant's motive
must be consistent with the purpose of obtaining medical
treatment."' Second, the content of the statement must be
reasonably relied on by the physician in order to provide
medical treatment or diagnosis."' Hence, the court decided
105. Id. at 80.
106. See id. at 82.
107. See id. at 82 n.6.
The doctor testified that, he first asked Lucy 'what happened' and she
didn't answer. He asked whether she was in any pain and she pointed
to her vaginal area. He asked if she hurt anywhere else and she didn't
answer. Dr. Hopkins again asked 'what happened' and Lucy said she
had been dragged into the bushes. The doctor then asked if the man
'had taken her clothes off.' She said yes... Dr. Hopkins testified that
he was not 'badgering' the patient, nor 'dragging information out', but
was asking 'simple questions.'
Id.
108. The majority rule under common law did not admit testimony about the
cause of the injury that was unrelated to the treatment of the declarant, and
the majority rule also did not admit hearsay statements made to a physician
solely for the purpose of testifying. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83
(8th Cir. 1980).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The court based this prong of the test on the fact that the patient has a
strong motive to tell the truth when obtaining medical treatment because the
diagnosis or treatment depends in a large part on what the patient tells the
doctor. Id. at 83-84.
112. The court ruled that hearsay statements are sufficiently trustworthy if
doctors reasonably rely on such statements to properly diagnose the patient.
Id. at 84.
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that the child-victim's statements can be included into
evidence only if the statements were reasonably related to
treatment and were relied upon by the doctor for diagnosis or
treatment.
113
Applying this two part test, the court held that the
child's statement's were appropriately allowed into evidence
because her motive for making the statements came from her
desire to seek treatment and not for any other reason."'
Additionally, the doctor's questions satisfied the second part
of the test because they elicited reasonably relied upon
information that assisted the doctor's diagnosis and
treatment of the victim."' The court held that the child's
statements effectively narrowed the doctor's physical
examination to the affected areas of her body."6 The court
stated it was not necessary that the patient's discussion of
events must "lead to a fundamentally different exam" as
opposed to if the statements were never stated."'
The court emphasized that the admitted statements
contained facts describing what happened rather than who
did it."'8 They concluded that statements describing what
happened are almost always pertinent to the diagnosis and
treatement, whereas statements regarding the identity of the
assailant would "seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related."1
19
2. United States v. Nick
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Nick,' 2' decided
whether the identity of an alleged child-abuse perpetrator
can be allowed into evidence under the medical diagnosis
exception.' 2' The court ultimately held that the identity of
the alleged assailant was not pertinent to the medical
diagnosis or treatment of the child-victim and therefore, was
113. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980).
114. See id.
115. See id. The court based this holding on the doctor's testimony, stating
"most doctors would have sought such a history and that he relied upon [the
child's] statements in deciding upon a course of treatment." Id. at 85.
116. The court rationalized that "discovering what is not injured is equally as
pertinent to treatment and diagnosis as finding what is injured." Id. at 84.
117. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980).
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979).
121. United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979).
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not allowed into evidence under this exception."'
In Nick, the defendant allegedly assaulted a three-year-
old boy while baby-sitting the child. When the child's mother
arrived, she found her son in a locked bedroom, asleep with
the defendant, and with his pants unzipped.12 After bringing
the child home and noticing evidence of a possible
molestation,'24 the mother questioned the boy and had a
physician examine him on the following day. 12' The physician
examined the three-year-old boy and discovered evidence of
sexual abuse. 26  While testifying, the doctor revealed the
child's description of the assault.' 7 However, the defendant
appealed his conviction arguing that the district court erred
in admitting the child's damaging hearsay statements into
evidence.'28 The damaging statements at issue concerned the
child-victim's identification of the defendant while he was
questioned by his physician.
19
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling,
holding that the child's statements were relevant to the cause
of his injury.' They held, however, that the identifying
statements could not be repeated at trial.' Therefore, the
court decision can be understood to hold that the identity of
the defendant was not admissible under Rule 803(4) because
it was not reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment
of the child.'32
3. United States v. Renville
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Renville, 33 took a
much more expansive approach to Rule 803(4) by allowing
122. See id. at 1202.
123. See id. at 1201.
124. The mother observed that there was "white stuff' in the child's clothing.
The mother also asked the child whether Nick had done anything to him, and
the child responded, "Yeah, Eneas [Nick] stuck his tutu in my butt." The child
also stated Nick had hurt him and made him cry. Id.
125. See id.
126. The doctor's physical examination of the child showed evidence of anal
penetration. See id.
127. United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1979).
128. See id. at 1200-01.
129. See id. at 1202.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1202.
133. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
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hearsay statements into evidence under the medical
diagnosis exception that identify an alleged abuser. The
Renville court ruled that identifying statements may be
allowed into evidence under the medical diagnosis exception
if the alleged abuser is a member of the child-victim's
immediate household.1
4
In Renville, the defendant was convicted on two counts of
child abuse for sexually abusing his eleven-year-old
stepdaughter.'35 The defendant appealed, arguing that the
district court erred by allowing the physician to repeat the
victim's statements in court.'36 The statements, originally
made during the child-victim's medical examination,
identified the defendant as her abuser.'37 The defendant
argued that the medical diagnosis hearsay exception does not
cover statements indicating fault or identity.'38
The Renville court applied the Iron Shell two part test.'
39
The court held that the medical diagnosis exception's
threshold question is whether the statement satisfies the
second part of the Iron Shell test: a statement that is
"reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.' 40  The
court, however, did not follow Iron Shell's holding and held
that when the identified abuser is a member of the child-
victim's immediate household, "a sufficiently different case
[is presented] from that envisaged by the drafters of Rule
803(4) [and] that it should not fall under the general rule.''
The court held that a child abuse victim's statements to a
physician during an examination, which identify a member of
the victim's immediate household as the abuser, "are
reasonably pertinent to treatment."
4 2
The court held that the statements in this case can be
distinguished from the statements of fault identified by the
Rules Advisory Committee and from the ones excluded by
134. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 431.
136. See id. at 435.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980). See also
discussion supra Part II.E.1.
140. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985).
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
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past decisions.14 The court believed that child abuse
"involves more than physical injury [because] the physician
must be attentive to treating the emotional and psychological
injuries which accompany this crime."'44 The court also
stated that physicians have an obligation to "prevent an
abused child from being returned to an environment in which
he or she cannot be adequateley protected from recurrent
abuse."'4'
The court also concluded that the identitifying
statements satisfy the first part of the Iron Shell test,14
which focuses on the declarant's motivation for giving the
information. 147  The court held that the physician properly
explained to the girl before questioning that the examination
would include questions necessary for effective diagnosis and
treatment. 48  Furthermore, the court held that the child's
motivation to answer the physician's questions was in
anticipation for the prospective treatment. 49 As a result, the
Renville court expanded the Iron Shell 5° and Nick.' approach
by allowing statements that identity child abuse
perpetrators, who are members of the victim's immediate
household, to be covered by the medical diagnosis exception
to the Hearsay Rule.5 2
4. Subsequent Federal Cases Applying the Expansive
View of Renville
Two subsequent cases expanded the medical diagnosis
exception similar to Renville. In United States v. Shaw,"' the
defendant appealed a conviction for sexually abusing his
eleven-year-old foster daughter.14 The defendant argued that
the girl's statements identifying fault were not reasonably
143. Id. See also discussion supra Part II.E.1-2.
144. Renville, 779 F.2d at 437. The court was convinced that the "extent of
the psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often depend on the
identity of the abuser." Id.
145. Id. at 438.
146. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
147. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
151. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
152. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985).
153. 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987).
154. United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1987).
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pertinent to her diagnosis or treatment.' Similarly, in
United States v. DeNoyer,'56 the defendant appealed a
conviction for engaging in involuntary sodomy with his five-
year-old son. 17 The defendant argued that the son's out-of-
court statements identifying the defendant to social workers
should have been excluded.'
The Shaw and DeNoyer courts followed Renville, holding
that the admission of the statements were appropriate
because "Is]tatements of fault made to a physician by a child
who has been sexually abused by a household member meet
Iron Shell's two part test and are admissible under 803(4)."1"
The DeNoyer court admitted the child-victim's hearsay
statements into evidence by following the Renville
explanation which stated that the "exact nature and extent of
psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often
depend on the identity of the abuser."'6 ° However, other
federal courts continued this expansion by allowing the
medical diagnosis exception to cover the identities of people
who are not members of the victim's immediate household.1
6 1
The Tenth Circuit expanded the "immediate household
member" criteria. 6 ' In United States v. Tome, 63 the
defendant was convicted of sexually abusing his daughter.
6
,
The defendant appealed, arguing that his daughter's
statements which identified him as the assailant to her
pediatrician did not fall under the medical diagnosis
exception. 65 The court disagreed, holding that the child's
statement to her doctor were "reasonably pertinent" to the
"proper diagnosis and treatment.",66  Furthermore, the court
155. See id. at 608.
156. 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987).
157. United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987).
158. See id.
159. United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 608 (8th Cir. 1987). See also De-
Noyer, 811 F.2d at 438.
160. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d at 438 (quoting United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d
430, 436-37 (8th Cir. 1985)).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1995); Territory
of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Farley, 992
F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172 (8th Cir.
1988).
162. See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1995).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 1449.
166. See id. at 1450.
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held that a hearsay statement revealing the identity of a
child abuser who is a member of the victim's family or
household, "is admissible under Rule 803(4) where the abuser
has such an intimate relationship with the victim that the
abuser's identity becomes 'reasonably pertinent' to the
victim's proper treatment."'67 Thus, the Tome court further
expanded the medical diagnosis exception to include
identifying statements of family members who may or may
not be immediate household members.
The Eighth Circuit distinguished their "family member"
criteria by including a victim's half-relation. In United States
v. Provost,'68 the alleged perpetrator was the child-victim's
half brother. The court held that the man was part of the
ten-year-old female victim's immediate family even though he
was the victim's half brother.'69 The court came to this
decision despite the fact that the defendant and the victim
did not continuously reside in the same household. 7 °
The Ninth Circuit further expanded the "family member"
criteria. In Territory of Guam v. Ignacio,7' the defendant
married his three-year-old victim's mother's first cousin.172
The defendant, therefore, was the victim's second cousin by
marriage. Although the defendant never resided in the
victim's household and was not a blood-relative to the victim,
the Ignacio court held that the identifying statements were
admissible because they pertained to the "cause or external
source" of the injury. 73
Following suit, the Tenth Circuit also continued to
expand Rule 803(4) by including a child-victim's statements
which identified an accused abuser who was not in any way
related to the victim.' 74 The defendant, in United States v.
Farley,17 was convicted of engaging in forced intercourse with
167. Id. (quoting United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th
Cir. 1993)).
168. 875 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1988).
169. United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1988).
170. They were at times before and during the time of the assault residing
together in their mother's home. See id.
171. Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993).
172. See id. at 610.
173. See id. at 613 (quoting United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir.
1992)).
174. See United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
175. Id.
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a five-year-old girl. 176  The defendant lived on the same
Indian reservation as the victim. 177  The Farley court,
however, did not base its holding on the "family member" or
"household member" rationale. Nonetheless, the court held
that the identifying statements could be covered by the
medical diagnosis hearsay exception because they were made
for the "purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment" by the
child-victim's psychologist.7 1 In effect, the Farley court's
decision did not require any family or household relation
whatsoever.
Two federal circuit courts have also expanded this
hearsay exception to include identifying statements made by
third parties.7 9 In United States v. Yazzie"8' and Lovejoy v.
United States,"' each mother of the child-victims identified
the alleged perpetrator to their respective child's physician."2
Both courts ruled that the identifying statements were
covered by the medical diagnosis hearsay exception because
the mothers' statements were made for medical purposes
with the intention of being pertinent to medical diagnosis
and treatment, and were important in aiding the medical
professionals' examinations of the victims.
1 3
However, two cases declined to extend the medical
diagnosis exception in particular situations where the alleged
abused children did not understand that they were speaking
to someone for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment.' In Ring v. Erickson,' a mother sought medical
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 1125.
179. See Lovejoy v. United States, 92 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995).
180. Yazzie, 59 F.3d at 807.
181. Lovejoy, 92 F.3d at 628.
182. In Yazzie the mother of the nine-year-old boy wrote a note to the physi-
cian implicating that the boy's stepfather had sexually abused him. The mother
also elaborated to the physician the extensive sexual abuse that went on be-
tween her son and his stepfather. Yazzie, 59 F.3d at 809. In Lovejoy, the
mother of the alleged sexually abused thirteen-year-old blind girl made state-
ments to a nurse while the girl was being examined. The mother stated she ob-
served the victim's father standing over the child with an erection, the victim's
underwear was down, and her T-shirt was pulled up. Lovejoy, 92 F.3d at 631-
32.
183. See Lovejoy, 92 F.3d at 632; Yazzie, 59 F.3d at 813.
184. See Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding the child
herself did not seek doctor's help, and there was no evidence that she even
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treatment for her three-year-old girl who was allegedly
sexually abused.'86 Evidence did not support any inference
that the girl understood the doctor was a treating physician
and that the doctor's purpose was to medically assist her.187
The court, therefore, did not admit the identifying statements
of the accused perpetrator into evidence 88 because the girl
did not have the necessary motive to tell the truth that is
ordinarily present when people seek medical diagnosis or
treatment.88 Thus, the Ring court held that the identifying
statements were not trustworthy enough to be covered by the
medical diagnosis exception because the patient herself did
not seek the doctor's help and evidence concluded that she
never knew she was talking to a doctor. 9 '
Similarly, United States v. White 9' followed the ruling of
Ring. The White court held that the child-victim's
statements made to a social worker were inadmissible under
the medical diagnosis exception because the child lacked the
necessary motive of seeking treatment or a diagnosis. 2 In
White, the nine-year-old male victim told a social worker the
identity of his alleged abuser.'93 However, the court held that
the child did not understand that he was speaking to the
social worker for the purpose of a medical diagnosis or
providing treatment for emotional or psychological injuries. 194
The court held that the evidence did not show that the child
understood "it was in his best interest to tell the truth and
knew she was talking to a doctor). See also United States v. White, 11 F.3d
1446 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding there was insufficient evidence to establish that
the child-victim understood the social worker was conducting an interview in
order for her or another to provide diagnosis or treatment for emotional and
psychological injuries).
185. Ring, 983 F.2d at 818.
186. Id. at 820.
187. The court rationalized that the victim was only three years old at the
time and there was no way that the girl realized she was seeking medical
treatment. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. The motive the court was speaking of is the selfish-motive doc-
trine which is "based on the belief that a person seeking medical treatment is
unlikely to lie to a doctor she wants to treat her, since it is in her best interest
to tell the truth." Id.
190. Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1993).
191. 11 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1993).
192. United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1450 (8th Cir. 1993).
193. Id. at 1448
194. See id.
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was therefore unlikely to lie."195  Therefore, the child's
statements were inadmissible because the social worker
never "explained her role and purpose" to the child and
because the child did not personally seek the help of the
social worker nor think he was speaking to a medical
professional.'96
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
"The solution evolved by the common law has been a
general rule excluding hearsay but subject to numerous
exceptions under circumstances [that] furnish guarantees of
trustworthiness."'97  Congress codified these common law
practices by enacting twenty-eight hearsay exceptions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence."9' The Supreme Court held that
hearsay evidence should only be admitted if it falls within
one of the "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions."'99  As
assistance, the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(4) explicitly set the guidelines for this exception
by stating that this Rule does not include statements as to
fault.
200
To the detriment of Rule 803(4), several federal courts
disregard the Advisory Committee Note and expand this Rule
to cover child abuse victims' statements made to their
medical provider which identify their alleged abuser.2 °' In
effect, some federal courts extend the medical diagnosis
exception to disregard the Advisory Committee Note and to
satisfy their goal of convicting the alleged perpetrator."'
195. Id. at 1450. The facts showed that the interview with the social worker
took place in an automobile around which the child's siblings were playing and
he was attempting to speak to the social worker in secrecy. The child had to
hide the pictures shown to him by the social worker in order to prevent the
children around him from seeing what he was doing. Id.
196. Id. at 1446.
197. FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's introductory note to the hearsay
problem.
198. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4), and 807.
199. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990).
200. The Advisory Committee Note states, "[t]he same guarantee of trust-
worthiness extends to statements of past conditions and medical history, made
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. It also extends to statements as to cau-
sation, reasonably pertinent to the same purposes .... Statements as to fault
would not ordinarily qualify under this latter language." FED. R. EVID. 803(4)
advisory committee's note.
201. See discussion supra Part II.E.3-4.
202. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
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Hence, the questions posed are: 1) whether the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception can be considered a firmly rooted
hearsay exception if the courts continue to expand the rule
beyond what was contemplated by Congress; and 2) do
arbitrary interpretations of Rule 803(4) by various federal
courts contradict the underlying theory of trustworthiness
that is supposed to support each exception to the Hearsay
rule?
IV. ANALYSIS
The child abuse problem in our country cannot be
ignored. In 1997, approximately 84,320 new cases of child
sexual abuse in the United States were accepted for service
203by child protective services. This number is significantly
higher than the 10,000 to 20,000 cases that were accepted for
service in the 1970s and early 1980s.2 4 It is disputed as to
what has caused this alarming increase."' However, it is not
disputed that attitudes toward sex crimes have become more
punitive.2 6 In part, the media has aided the shaping of
attitudes toward child abuse in this country by publicizing
court proceedings. 27  For example, media coverage in the
1970s and 1980s showed protestors picketing courtrooms
across America who were pleading for tougher penalties
against the sex offenders on trial.2 8 Elected judges were also
pressured by the public and were wary of being stereotyped
as lenient on sex offenders.2 9
As a result, efforts have been made to penalize child
abuse perpetrators to the greatest extent possible.210 Such
efforts include admitting evidence that would not be allowed
203. See The Center on Child Abuse Prevention Research, Current Trends in
Child Abuse Reporting and Fatalities: The Results of the 1997 Annual Fifty
State Survey (visited Jan. 6, 1999) <http://www.childabuse.org/50data97.html>.
204. See id.
205. See SELKIN, supra note 33, at 3.
206. See id. at 4
207. See id. at 287. See also discussion supra part II.A.
208. See SELKIN, supra note 33, at 3-4. The protests were partly the result
of the women's movement in the 1970s. Many of these protests dealt with the
movement against rape and the push for longer prison terms of convicted rap-
ists. As a result of longer prison terms for convicted rapists becoming the norm
rather than the exception, sexual crimes against children were, and are now,
vigorously prosecuted. Id.
209. See id.
210. See SELKIN, supra note 33, at 4.
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under most other circumstances.211  These efforts are
exemplified by some federal court interpretations of Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(4) to include statements, made by an
abused child to a physician, that identify the alleged
abuser.21 Among the range of problems associated with this
practice is the weakening of a valuable hearsay exception.212
A. The Expansive, Differing, and Arbitrary Federal Court
Rulings of Admitting the Identity of Alleged Child Abuse
Perpetrators Under Rule 803(4) Makes This Hearsay
Exception Less Firmly Rooted
Experts agree that child sexual abuse is often very
difficult to prove because molestation normally occurs in
secret and the child is usually the only eyewitness. 14 This
problem multiplies when "children find the courtroom a
forbidding place, and when a child is asked to testify against
a familiar person . . . the experience can be exasperat-
ing." "' As a result, "prosecutors turn to physicians,
psychiatrists, social workers, and psychologists" to testify to
the out-of-court statements the child-victims stated.1 6
Frequently, the child hearsay statements are the most
valuable pieces of evidence collected and relied upon to
successfully prosecute an alleged abuser. 17 One way these
hearsay statements are allowed into evidence at trial is by
introducing them under the medical diagnosis hearsay
exception.1 ' However, courts differ as to whether identifying
statements made by the child-victim to his or her medical
provider should be admitted under this exception.219 The
differing of ideas and application of the medical diagnosis
exception makes it a less firmly rooted hearsay exception.
1. The Problems Associated With the Differing and
211. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.E.3-4.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985)
(finding child-victim's statement to her treating physician as identifying the
defendant as her abuser is admissible evidence).
213. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
214. See 1 MYERS, supra note 27, at 411.
215. Id.
216. See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 218-19 (2d. ed. 1992).
217. See MYERS, supra note 4, at 260.
218. See id. at 357-59.
219. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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Expansive Applications of Rule 803(4)
Justice Blackmun noted, "[s]tatements squarely within
established hearsay exceptions possess the imprimatur of
judicial and legislative experience ... and that fact must
weigh heavily in our assessment of their reliability for
constitutional purposes.""' However, the differing and
expansive interpretations of Rule 803(4) make this exception
less established and allow unforseeable hearsay statements
to be included under this Rule. Therefore, the reliability of
this exception is greatly minimized.
For example, the Iron Shell... court initially refused to
extend this hearsay exception to include statements
containing the identity of the assailant.222 The court based its
holding on the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(4),
which provides that "statements as to fault would not
ordinarily qualify."22 3 The court also emphasized that the age
of the victim/patient declarant is not a determining factor as
to whether the statements fall within the traditional
rationale of the rule.2 Hence, this court concluded that child
abuse cases should not be treated any differently than injury
liability cases when using the medical diagnosis exception. 25
This holding represented that statements as to "what
happened" will fall under the medical diagnosis exception,
but statements as to "who did it" will not.22 6
Furthermore, the Nick227 court concluded that statements
identifying the perpetrator were not relevant to the cause of
the injury because not only were they considered statements
as to fault, but they were also not reasonably pertinent to the
diagnosis or treatment of the child.228  This holding
represented the general rule and consensus of courts and
220. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
552 (1986)); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
221. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
222. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
223. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 n.10 (quoting from the advisory committee
notes of 803(4) that "a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile
would qualify but not his statement that the car was driven through a red
light." FED. R. EVID. 803(4)).
224. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979). See also supra
note 132 and accompanying text.
228. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
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commentators regarding the application of the medical
diagnosis exception in child abuse cases."' This rule was
followed from the inception of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975 to the mid-1980s.23 ° However, during the 1980s, some
federal courts expanded this general rule which was followed
for almost a decade.23 This was the beginning of the end of
Rule 803(4) as a firmly established and reliable hearsay
exception.
The Renville23 court expanded the medical diagnosis
exception by holding that the exception properly covers
identifying statements of the alleged perpetrator if the
accused is a member of the child abuse victim's "immediate
household."233 The court expanded the inclusive capabilities
of the exception because it felt that a perpetrator who lives
under the same roof of the child-victim poses a greater and
more significant risk to the treatment and diagnosis of the
child than a "non-immediate household" perpetrator.23 4 This
holding, if strictly followed, may have been adequate in
maintaining Rule 803(4) as a firmly established exception.
However, federal courts continued the expansive weakening
of Rule 803(4) in subsequent cases."'
The "victim's immediate household" distinction became
the "member of the victim's family" distinction.236 Currently,
some courts perceive no difference between a family member
living in the victim's household and one who is a frequent or
infrequent visitor. The only distinction is whether the
defendant is in one way or another related to the victim.
2 37
229. See e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980); Nick,
604 F.2d 1199.
230. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.E.1-2.
231. See discussion supra Part II.E.3 (discussing that the Renville court held
that identifying statements would be admissible under the medical diagnosis
exception).
232. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
233. See discussion supra Part II.E.3.
234. The court expressed that "sexual abuse at home presents a wholly dif-
ferent situation" than abuse that is not involved in the child's home; thereby,
statements of fault are not relevant to perpetrators who do not live in the vic-
tim's home. See Renville, 779 F.2d at 437.
235. See, e.g., Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
236. Renville, 779 F.2d at 437. See also discussion supra Part II.E.4.
237. See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1995) (where the
child-victim's abuser was the child's father and the father lived in a separate
household); United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989) (where the
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This relation, however, does not have to be from a blood
relation.238 For example, the expansion of Rule 803(4) also
includes family relations by marriage.239  In Ignacio,141 the
identity of the defendant was allowed into evidence because
141he was married to the victim's second cousin.
Consequently, courts continued to expand the exception and
now the identified perpetrator does not have to be either a
member of the victim's immediate household or a member of
the victim's family. 42
For example, in United States v. Farley,2 43 the court
allowed the identity of the defendant into evidence even
though he was not related to the victim and he did not live in
the same household. 44 The court disregarded the "household
member" and "family member" criteria. Instead, the Farley
court held that such evidence could be admitted solely for the
reason that the statements were made for medical diagnosis
and treatment.2 45 This practice is followed even when courts
are not presented with evidence showing that the alleged
abuser is either a relative or a household member, which
usually correlates the need for the identifying statement to
administer proper medical diagnosis or treatment.246
The federal courts are continuously expanding Rule
803(4).247 Initially, the courts refused to extend this exception
to include identifying statements of the alleged abuser.2 48
child-victim's abuser was her half-brother who did not continuously reside in
the same household with the victim). See also Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10
F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993) (the defendant in this case was the husband of the
child-victim's mother's first cousin. In other words, the defendant was the
child-victim's second cousin by marriage).
238. See, e.g., Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993).
239. See id.
240. Id. See also discussion supra Part II.E.4.
241. See supra text accompanying note 171.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir. 1995); Territory
of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Provost, 875
F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).
243. 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993). See also discussion supra Part II.E.4.
244. United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993) (the defendant
was a resident on the same Navajo Indian Reservation of the child-victim).
245. Id. at 1125.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 608 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that statements of fault which identify a household member are ad-
missible under the medical diagnosis exception because doctors take domestic
abuse into account when making a diagnosis and administering a plan of
treatment).
247. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
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Then, the courts extended the exception to include
identifying statements of an alleged abuser if he or she was a
member of the victim's household.249 Some years later, the
"victim's immediate household" distinction of Rule 803(4)
stretched to include "a member of the victim's family."259
Currently, some courts choose to not follow either criteria
and instead base their rulings on doctors' testimony. These
rulings are unpredictable because they depend on whether
the doctor states he or she relies upon such statements to
provide a medical diagnosis or treatment for the child.51
Hence, the courts' applications of Rule 803(4) will contrast as
much as doctors' opinions and testimony contrast. Therefore,
the differing and expansive applications of the medical
diagnosis exception makes Rule 803(4) a less reliable hearsay
exception because it is gradually losing its once defined
boundaries.
2. The Problems Associated With The Arbitrary Court
Interpretations that Disregard, in Part, the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 803(4)
The United States legislature enacted the Federal Rules
of Evidence to "secure fairness in administration ... and [for
the] promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.""2  Congress promotes
"fairness in administration" by offering an Advisory
Committee Note in adjunct with each evidence rule. These
notes guide the courts administration of justice by providing
some indication of legislative intent.5 Hence, in the search
for the intended application of the rules and to maintain
them as firmly rooted exceptions, courts should rely on the
accompanying Advisory Committee Notes. 54
249. See, e.g., United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
250. See, e.g., Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
252. FED. R. EVID. 102.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980)
(quoting the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(4) in footnote 10 of this case,
and using the Note to support its holding).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985)
(the court referred to the Advisory Committee Note to supports its ruling);
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing the Advisory
Committee when discussing the liberalization effect Rule 803(4) had on prior
court practices).
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The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(4) explicitly
denotes that statements covered by the medical diagnosis
exception are "past conditions and medical history, made for
purposes of diagnosis or treatment. It also extends to
statements as to causation, reasonably pertinent to the same
purposes .... Statements as to fault would not ordinarily
qualify under this latter language."255 The note states that if
statements as to causation carry the burden of fault, such
statements will not be allowed under this exception.25
Common sense cannot ignore the fact that the identification
of a perpetrator will cast a strong sense of fault onto the
accused, notwithstanding that a medical provider uses the
identification of the assailant for treatment or diagnosis
purposes.
However, some federal courts have chosen to disregard
this result. These courts decide to give greater credence to
the attending medical provider who may reason that he or
she uses the identification of the alleged perpetrator for
treatment and/or diagnosis of the victim.257 Regardless, such
balancing of interests perpetuates a strong contradiction
against the Advisory Committee Note and the underlying
purpose of Rule 803(4).258
The Advisory Committee Notes offer a guide and basis
for applying each Evidence Rule. The Note to Rule 803(4)
explicitly states that statements as to fault should not be
included under this hearsay exception.5  Identifying
statements will undoubtedly cast some sense of fault onto the
alleged abusers. However, some federal courts have decided
to disregard the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(4) and
have, in effect, made the Rule a "less firmly rooted" hearsay
exception.6 °
255. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
256. See id.
257. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
258. The underlying purpose of Rule 803(4) is to allow the patient's state-
ments into evidence because the patient has a strong motive to tell the truth
when the diagnosis and treatment depends upon what the patient says. United
States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1980). However, these state-
ments are only admissible when they are "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment." Id. at 83. The Advisory Committee's Note states that statements
as to fault would not ordinarily qualify for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
259. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
260. The Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright stated that "a firmly rooted
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B. Allowing the Identity of an Alleged Child Abuser into
Evidence Under Rule 803(4) Contradicts the Main
Principles of the Hearsay Exceptions
The two main considerations for allowing hearsay
statements into evidence is the necessity for the use and the
inherent trustworthiness of the statements."' Courts
frequently disregard these two inherent factors by allowing
hearsay statements into evidence that identify an accused
child abuser.
1. It Is Not Necessary to Admit the Identifying
Statements Under the Medical Diagnosis Exception
Profesor John E.B. Myers,262 an expert on investigation
and litigation of child abuse and neglect, stated that hearsay
statements of child abuse victims are frequently necessary
for the successful prosecution of alleged child abusers. 263 This
is based on the fact that child abuse is "often exceedingly
difficult to prove" because the child-victim is often the only
witness to the crime. 264 The Supreme Court also stated that
"[cihild abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and
prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim."26 For this reason, different groups have
strived to find ways to prosecute such crimes and part of the
result has been to allow identifying statements made by the
child-victim into evidence.266  However, allowing such
hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because
of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in as-
sessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements." Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). Nonetheless, the federal courts differ as to:
1) allowing or not allowing identifying statements into evidence, and 2) disre-
garding or complying with the legislature's Advisory Committee's Note that
states "[s]tatements as to fault do not ordinarily qualify." See FED. R. EVID.
803(4) advisory committee's notes. See also discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
Hence, since there is no longstanding judicial experience in allowing identifying
statements into evidence and since the legislature's assessment in its Advisory
Committee's Note is at times disregarded by some courts, the federal courts dif-
fering and expansive applications of Rule 803(4) has made the exception a "less
firmly rooted" hearsay exception.
261. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. See also discussion su-
pra Part II.C.1.
262. See MYERS, supra note 216, at ix.
263. Id. at v.
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987)).
266. See MYERS, supra note 4, at 372.
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statements into evidence under the medical diagnosis
exception may be unnecesary since alternative options are
available.
In many situations, the identifying statements made by
the child-victim can easily come in under other hearsay
exceptions such as the excited utterance or residual hearsay
exceptions.267 When these alternatives are available, there is
no need to admit the identifying hearsay statements by
misconstruing the medical diagnosis exception. However,
when these alternatives are not available, the medical
diagnosis exception may be the only means for allowing the
child-victim hearsay statements into evidence. Nonetheless,
there may still be some doubt as to whether the child-victim's
hearsay statement contains the inherent sense of
trustworthiness to fit under the medical diagnosis exception.
2. The Identifying Statements of the Child-Victim Are
Not Always Inherently Trustworthy
The essential reason statements made for the purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment fall under a separate
hearsay exception is because such statements are usually
made from a strong motivation by the patient to be truth-
ful.268  In order for such statements to be inherently
trustworthy, the patient must believe the "effectiveness of
the treatment he receives depends largely upon the accuracy
of the information he provides to the physician."269
It is not clear whether young children understand the
importance of being truthful with health care providers. One
267. Compare Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85 (police officer was allowed to testify
as to what nine-year-old victim said following the assault under the excited ut-
terance hearsay exception), and Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th
Cir. 1993) (child statement to defendant's wife that defendant had molested
child was admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception to the
hearsay rule), with United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993)
(sexually abused child's account of assault told to mother was admissible under
the residual hearsay exception), and Lovejoy v. United States, 92 F.3d 628 (8th
Cir. 1996) (nurse's hearsay testimony of statements made by mother of alleged
child-victim of attempted sexual abuse during daughter's medical examination,
that mother had seen defendant, child's father, standing over child with an
erection and that child's underwear was down and her T-shirt was pulled up,
were admissible under the residual hearsay exception).
268. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note.
269. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 839 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (citing Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298, 305
(Me. 1966)).
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child psychologist concluded, "[1]ogical concepts such as cause
of illness, necessity of treatment, and role of medical
personnel are often beyond the inherent developmental
ability of the young patient."27 °  For example, child
psychologist Margaret Steward described a situation
illustrating this point. Steward interviewed a young boy who
was in the hospital after he suffered a concussion and a
fractured skull.27' When the boy was asked if the doctors
were helping him get well, the boy answered, "[n]o, the
doctors are berry mean."72
This situation can be further complicated when the
traditional physician or nurse is not providing the health
care, but rather a psychotherapist or social worker is tending
to the child's physical and emotional needs.273 Two common
reasons for a child not to appreciate the need to be accurate
and truthful with the psychotherapist or social worker are: 1)
the child may not understand the sessions are therapeutic or
in his best interest, and 2) "psychotherapy usually occurs in
surroundings that would not remind a child of being in the
traditional doctor's office."274
Because of such problems, the Ring " and White... courts
refused to admit identifying statements of an alleged child
abuser into evidence under the medical diagnosis exception.277
In both cases the courts refused to allow the statements into
evidence because the children did not understand the
purpose of the health care providers or the type of help they
could receive.2 78 These holdings kept the underlying purpose
of trustworthiness in mind.7 9 Unfortunately, not all courts
pay enough attention to this kind of analysis.
Yazzie2 8° and Lovejoy2"' are two such cases. Both courts
extended the medical diagnosis exception to include
270. 2 JoHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES
219-20 (2d ed. 1992).
271. See id. at 220.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 221-22.
274. Id. at 222.
275. Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1993).
276. United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1993).
277. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
278. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
279. See supra note 258 (discussing the underlying purpose of Rule 803(4)).
280. United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995).
281. Lovejoy v. United States, 92 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1996).
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identifying statements made by someone other than the
actual child-victim.282 In both cases the statements were
made by the mothers of the victims.28 The rationale given by
both courts for extending the exception was that the mothers'
statements were made with the intention of assisting the
medical professionals' examinations of the victims.28
Although this was most likely true in these two cases, this
rationale allows for the possibility of admitting statements
that were intentionally made for ill-conceived reasons.
For example, "parental custody and visitation
disputes ... [are] fertile sources for the production of
fictitious allegations."85 Unfortunately, these types of cases
occur quite frequently in family and divorce court settings.28 6
For this reason, "professionals [working] in the area of child
sexual abuse evaluations find the coexistence of custody
disputes with child sex allegations a particularly difficult
area of work"287 because inter-family disputes may lead to
spiteful and fictitious allegations.288 Despite all this, many
federal courts seem to hold that Rule 803(4) is an adequate
and proper tool for admitting identifying statements of
alleged child abusers made by child-victims; and in some
instances, made by relatives of the victims.288
Professor Myers contends that the medical diagnosis
exception was designed for adults.29 Therefore, when the
exception is applied to young children, legitimate questions
are raised about their understanding of the need to be
truthful.2"' These legitimate concerns support the doubt
surrounding the reliability of such statements.2 92 This doubt
282. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
283. See Lovejoy, 92 F.3d at 632; Yazzie, 59 F.3d at 809.
284. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
285. David P. Jones & Ann Seig, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody
or Visitation Disputes, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND
VISITATION CASES 22 (E. Bruce Nicholson ed., 1988).
286. It is believed that the rate of fictitious allegations may be as high as
50% in child abuse cases involving divorce, custody, and visitation issues. See
Raskin & Yuille, supra note 3, at 186.
287. See Jones & Seig, supra note 285, at 22.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. United States, 92 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995). See also discussion supra Part
JI.E.4.
290. See generally MYERS, supra note 270, at 221.
291. Id.
292. See id.
900 [Vol. 39
1999] GRADUAL DECLINE OF F.R.E. 803(4)
should caution courts from extending the medical diagnosis
exception to cover identifying statements made by a child to a
health care provider.
In many situations the necessity for admitting the
identifying evidence under Rule 803(4) is questionable.
Additionally, there are many instances when the motivation
for making such statements does not carry the inherent
trustworthiness needed to apply the medical diagnosis
exception. Furthermore, it is contended that the medical
diagnosis exception was intended for statements made by
adults. For these reasons, admitting identifying statements
made by child abuse victims conflicts with the main
principles of the medical diagnosis hearsay exception.9
V. PROPOSAL
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) is not the appropriate
exception for admitting statements, made by child abuse
victims to their health-care providers, that identify alleged
abusers. Nevertheless, most everyone with some sense of
decency agrees that the child abuse problem must be stopped.
However, admitting such statements under the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception ignores the legal protections
intended by the Hearsay Rule.294 It also misconstrues the
framers' guidelines and intentions of Rule 803(4).295
When possible, the federal courts should continue to use
other hearsay exceptions to admit identifying statements into
evidence, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2),296 the
excited utterance exception, and Federal Rule of Evidence
807,297 the residual hearsay exception. In some situations,
however, the child-victim's out-of-court statements do not fit
under these two hearsay exceptions.298  Therefore, if
alternative exceptions such as these are not an adequate
solution for prosecutors and the courts to be able to utilize all
the reliable and vital evidence gathered to convict child
abusers, Congress must enact a provision in the Federal
293. See supra note 258 (discussing the underlying purpose of Rule 803(4)).
294. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
295. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. See also supra note 258 (discussing
the underlying purpose of Rule 803(4)).
296. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
297. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
298. See MYERS, supra note 4, at 372.
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Rules of Evidence that would solve this problem.
More than two-thirds of the states in this country have
already attempted to solve this problem by enacting specific
hearsay exceptions for statements made by child abuse
victims. 9 9 These hearsay exceptions make it possible to
admit child-hearsay in child abuse cases that would
otherwise be inadmissible.3 °°  In essence, these statutes
authorize the admission of any reliable out-of-court
statements made by abused children that pertains to the
abuse.31 These statutes are the result of states clarifying a
vague area in their evidence codes which never before dealt
with reliable out-of-court statements made by child-abuse
victims. °2
In 1995 the California legislature enacted a medical
diagnosis hearsay exception specifically for child-abuse cases.
299. See Marks, supra note 31, at 237.
300. See id.
301. See MYERS, supra note 4, at 372.
302. The Washington state legislature enacted a child victim hearsay excep-
tion in 1982 and this exception has served as a model for other states. See id.
at 373. The Washington statute states:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any
act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another ... not
otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence
in dependency proceedings.., and criminal proceedings . . . in the
courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of
the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the state-
ment provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: PROVIDED, That when the child is
unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if
there is corroborative evidence of the act.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1998).
The Florida statute is similar to the Washington statute. See MYERS, supra
note 4 at 372 n.533. This statute is titled the Statement of Child Victim hear-
say exception and states in relevant part:
Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an
out-of-court statement made by a child victim with a physical, mental,
emotional, or developmental age of 11 or less describing any act of
child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual abuse against a child, the of-
fense of child abuse, the offense of aggravated child abuse, or any of-
fense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or penetra-
tion performed in the presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child,
not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or
criminal proceeding ....
FLA. STAT. ch. 90.803(23)(a) (1998)
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Section 1253 of the California Evidence Code states in
relevant part:
[E]vidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if the statement was made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment and describes medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment. This section applies only to a
statement made by a victim who is a minor at the time of
the proceedings, provided the statement was made when
the victim was under the age of 12 describing any act, or
attempted act, of child abuse or neglect .... 303
This exception takes into consideration the importance of
admitting out-of-court statements made by abused children
into evidence. In essence, this statute allows into evidence
some out-of-court statements made by children which iden-
tify the child-victim's abuser.34 A statute such as this would
alleviate the need to compromise, Rule 803(4), the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception. Furthermore, the enactment of
a similar federal statute will allow for a more consistent, fair
and predictable approach to admitting such evidence.
If Congress does not follow the lead of the states, the
medical diagnosis exception will continuously be
misconstrued and ultimately be weakened. The medical
diagnosis exception was not intended to include identifying
statements of child abuse perpetrators. 35 These statements
cast fault on the alleged perpetrator and statements of fault
are explicitly prohibited by the Advisory Committee's Notes
to the Rule." 6 Therefore, Congress should enact a statute
that specifically covers child-hearsay in child abuse
situations. More importantly, the provision should maintain
the underlying characteristic of the other hearsay
exceptions-an inherent sense of trustworthiness. Congress
should enact such a statute or we will continue to witness the
deterioration and gradual decline of the once "firmly
established" medical diagnosis exception to the Hearsay
Rule.
303. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1253
304. See id.
305. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
306. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This comment discussed how the increase of reported
child sexual abuse cases directly relates to society taking
great measures to stop and deter child abusers."' In effect,
child-protective groups influenced the criminal justice system
to toughen their stance against child abusers."8 Following
society's anger, courts were also able to assist this objective
by admitting hearsay statements made by a child-victim to a
medical provider that identify the alleged abuser."9 However,
this solution contradicted and misconstrued the main
principles of one particular exception which was used to
allow such statements into evidence-Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(4), the medical diagnosis hearsay exception.10
In effect, the differing and expansive federal court rulings of
Rule 803(4) make the medical diagnosis exception less
reliable and "less firmly rooted."31'
No rational person wants to compromise the health and
safety of our country's children. However, if the medical
diagnosis hearsay exception is strictly interpreted, the
abused and violated children of our country cannot be
adequately protected. Therefore, Congress needs to take
action. Congress should add another exception to the hearsay
rule that takes into consideration the basic underlying
principles of the Hearsay Rule, the exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule, and the needs of our country's children. In this way,
neither the health and safety of our country's children nor
the federal legal system will be compromised.
Robert R. Rugani, Jr.
307. See discussion supra Part II.A.
308. Among others, one solution was to enact tougher penalties against con-
victed child sex offenders. See SELKIN, supra note 33, at 281.
309. See discussion supra Part II.E.
310. See discussion supra Part IV.
311. See discussion supra Part IV.
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